Statement by Ambassador Mr. Toshiro OZAWA on Cluster 3 Specific issue – Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty at the First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Mr. Chairman,

During the discussion on Cluster III held yesterday, I expressed Japan’s determination to promote the highest levels of nuclear safety worldwide, in the context of Japan’s general position on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Given the importance of this issue, I wish to elaborate today on some concrete measures in this regard, followed by a few words on our efforts to strengthen nuclear security in Japan. In addition, I will touch upon Japan’s view on the withdrawal provision of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

Japan is determined to raise the safety of its nuclear power generation to the highest level worldwide.

Soon after the 11 March 2011 accident, the Government of Japan directed the electricity utilities operating nuclear power plants to take emergency safety measures, such as securing additional power supplies for an emergency, conducting emergency response drills and inspections on emergency readiness, and reinforcing measures to protect buildings from flooding. In addition, the Government of Japan directed the electricity utilities to implement preparatory measures for severe accidents, such as additional measures to secure the means of communication inside station premises in case of an emergency. On “stress tests”, the Government of Japan requested that electricity utilities implement comprehensive safety assessments of power reactor facilities (stress tests) and to report the results to the Government. Thus far, 19 reports have been submitted, and the results of 2 nuclear reactors have been endorsed by the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese government has developed new safety standards for the operation of nuclear power generation, taking into account knowledge gained from experience, including through the stress tests. In parallel with the implementation of these measures, efforts are being made to pass legislation to establish a “Nuclear Regulatory Agency”.

Japan is conscious of its responsibility to share with the international community the knowledge gained and lessons learned from the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In this regard, we have, so far, presented two reports to the IAEA.

Needless to say, Japan has been doing its utmost to address the issues identified in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. As an important part of this effort, Japan has received an IAEA international mission on remediation, and an IAEA Review Mission for evaluating the procedures applied in Japan’s Stress Test review process. The reports of these missions have been made available to the international community. In addition, Japan has submitted proposals, for IAEA Member States’ consideration, that we believe will strengthen the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) and enhance the implementation of the Early Notification Convention.

On the Action Plan, Japan made a voluntary contribution of approximately 9 million Euro to support the IAEA’s activities related to the Fukushima accident, and made another voluntary contribution amounting to 4 million Euro in March to assist the implementation of the Action Plan as a whole. Japan has also dispatched one cost-free-expert to assist the IAEA’s efforts for the implementation of the Action Plan.

My delegation has expressed, on a number of occasions, that Japan is organising the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety from 15 to 17 December 2012 in co-sponsorship with the IAEA. This conference will provide an important opportunity to share with the international community further knowledge and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, in order to further enhance transparency, and to discuss the progress of the international efforts in strengthening nuclear safety especially with regard to the IAEA Action Plan. Japan is committed to making its best efforts to ensure that this conference will contribute to promoting the highest levels of nuclear safety worldwide.

Mr. Chairman,

In light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japan has begun to fundamentally strengthen domestic nuclear security measures. This will allow us to overcome the vulnerabilities in our nuclear facilities that were exposed in the accident.

As I stated earlier, Japan has been reinforcing the power supplies to the nuclear power plants and addressing the vulnerabilities in our power supply system. These measures, we believe, will enhance our preparedness against potential terrorist attacks as well.

The Fukushima Daiichi accident also demonstrated the importance of trained and knowledgeable people taking counter measures on the site. In this regard, we have found that effective on-site coordination among various organizations is vital. Japan has started a process of strengthening its response procedures and inter-agency coordination manuals, carrying out rigorous training and conducting additional joint field drills among relevant authorities.

In addition, Japan will strengthen its special counter-terror security measures.

First, we will increase the number of armed security personnel and strengthen the system of patrols. While maintaining respect for personal privacy, we will also continue to examine our system to determine the trustworthiness of those persons working at nuclear facilities.

Second, we will introduce redundancies in central alarm stations and enhance protective measures for important equipment located outside of the inner areas.

And third, we will continue to strengthen measures to block the computer systems in nuclear facilities from outside networks, in order to better provide protection against cyber attacks.

Mr. Chairman,

It should be noted that nuclear security, like non-proliferation and disarmament, cannot be achieved through the efforts of one country alone. International cooperation involving close coordination among all relevant countries, as well as cooperation with the IAEA, is essential in our efforts to avert the risk of theft from countries with weak protection. In this regard, the IAEA should play the key role in the development of safety standards, nuclear security guidance and conventions, based on best practice. Japan will continue to contribute to the strengthening of nuclear security in cooperation with the IAEA. Since the establishment of the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in Japan, we have organised regional training courses for Asian countries on physical protection in cooperation with the IAEA. We will continue to actively contribute through this Support Center.

Mr. Chairman,

The 2010 NPT Review Conference was a great success and saw consensus on many issues, but  consensus was not reached on one of the most important and pressing problems facing the NPT regime: that of the withdrawal from the Treaty.  As we begin the cycle of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, we must work towards achieving a consensus on this matter so that we can see an outcome at the next Review Conference that will strengthen the NPT regime.

Our debate on this issue should not be aimed at limiting the sovereign right of any State Party to withdraw from the Treaty, as recognized under Article X of the Treaty. However, the withdrawal of any State Party from the Treaty may undermine the integrity and universality of the Treaty itself. Therefore, withdrawal from the NPT should be prevented to the fullest extent possible so as to maintain the integrity and universality of the NPT. In order to address the issue of withdrawal, we believe it is important to take a holistic approach, both to encourage States Parties to remain in the NPT and to discourage States Parties from withdrawing, particularly in a manner that would abuse the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

First, in order to encourage Parties to remain in and to discourage them from withdrawing from the NPT, the States Parties should reemphasize the importance of the integrity and universality of the NPT, as well as reaffirm that the NPT serves as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan believes that reconfirming and bolstering the benefits of the NPT are crucial to preventing withdrawal.

In this regard, the 2010 NPT Action Plan including actions on nuclear disarmament, the negative security assurances (NSAs), and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully and faithfully implemented.

Second, the States Parties should specifically address how we respond to any withdrawal, in particular in a manner that would abuse the right to withdraw from the NPT. Any NPT Party’s withdrawal, that had been diverting peaceful nuclear supplies for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, should be considered to be an abuse of that right. We could consider a number of such possible cases such as consultations with the withdrawing Party prior to the effective date of withdrawal, continuity of international safeguards on materials and equipment obtained while Party to the Treaty, and the inclusion of dismantlement and/or return clauses into legally-binding supply agreements with other State Parties.

Furthermore, State Parties should reaffirm that it is consistent with international law that a withdrawing Party will be held responsible for violations committed prior to its withdrawal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.