Statement by Ambassador KAIFU Atsushi at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting starting on Monday, 2 March 2026 Item 10: Any Other Business
2026/3/6
Thank you, Chair, allow me to offer some comments under this agenda item AOB.
First, on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.
Japan welcomes the updates given by Australia yesterday and appreciates AUKUS partners’ efforts to further ensure transparency. We also appreciate their firm commitment to maintaining the highest possible non-proliferation standards as it is crucially important to maintain and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We steadily support the secretariat’s dedicated efforts to find ways to facilitate possible verification and monitoring activities in relation to the program.
Second, I wish to briefly touch upon some assertions, raised by one preceding specific speaker yesterday, that are inaccurate. I am very much privileged to offer, yet once more again, the following statements for the sake of accurate understanding based on the facts, not based on “man-made narratives”.
On Japan's security policy. Our defense capability is necessary to ensure the security of Japan in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under its Constitution, Japan has been adhering to the basic policy of maintaining the exclusively national defense-oriented one, and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries.
I would also like to reply briefly to the alleged assertion regarding the discussion of nuclear-powered submarine in Japan. No specific consideration has been given to date. Period.
And, on nuclear materials. Just for the sake of clarity, Japan’s plutonium stocks are used for peaceful purposes such as mixed oxide fuel for research or power generation and are under stringent IAEA safeguards as well. The IAEA has been drawing the broader conclusion that all nuclear materials in Japan, including plutonium, remain in peaceful activities. Japan continues to uphold the principle of “not possessing plutonium without specific purposes” and take appropriate measures to implement the policy to reduce the amount of its plutonium stockpiles. Therefore, there are no issues in relation to non-proliferation.
In this regard, I would like to remind you all of significance and importance of the INFCIRC 549 mechanism of IAEA for civil plutonium management. I further on remind you all of the fact that its implementation by one specific Nuclear Weapon State has ceased since 2018. This is causing a serious lack of transparency.
And finally, as already stated in my previous statement in the preceding agenda item, Japan observes its three non-nuclear principles. Japan has been and continues to be in compliance with its obligations under the NPT.
Japan has been consistently pursuing a path as a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, contributing to global peace and prosperity. This stance remains unchanged.
Thank you, Chair.
First, on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.
Japan welcomes the updates given by Australia yesterday and appreciates AUKUS partners’ efforts to further ensure transparency. We also appreciate their firm commitment to maintaining the highest possible non-proliferation standards as it is crucially important to maintain and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We steadily support the secretariat’s dedicated efforts to find ways to facilitate possible verification and monitoring activities in relation to the program.
Second, I wish to briefly touch upon some assertions, raised by one preceding specific speaker yesterday, that are inaccurate. I am very much privileged to offer, yet once more again, the following statements for the sake of accurate understanding based on the facts, not based on “man-made narratives”.
On Japan's security policy. Our defense capability is necessary to ensure the security of Japan in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under its Constitution, Japan has been adhering to the basic policy of maintaining the exclusively national defense-oriented one, and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries.
I would also like to reply briefly to the alleged assertion regarding the discussion of nuclear-powered submarine in Japan. No specific consideration has been given to date. Period.
And, on nuclear materials. Just for the sake of clarity, Japan’s plutonium stocks are used for peaceful purposes such as mixed oxide fuel for research or power generation and are under stringent IAEA safeguards as well. The IAEA has been drawing the broader conclusion that all nuclear materials in Japan, including plutonium, remain in peaceful activities. Japan continues to uphold the principle of “not possessing plutonium without specific purposes” and take appropriate measures to implement the policy to reduce the amount of its plutonium stockpiles. Therefore, there are no issues in relation to non-proliferation.
In this regard, I would like to remind you all of significance and importance of the INFCIRC 549 mechanism of IAEA for civil plutonium management. I further on remind you all of the fact that its implementation by one specific Nuclear Weapon State has ceased since 2018. This is causing a serious lack of transparency.
And finally, as already stated in my previous statement in the preceding agenda item, Japan observes its three non-nuclear principles. Japan has been and continues to be in compliance with its obligations under the NPT.
Japan has been consistently pursuing a path as a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, contributing to global peace and prosperity. This stance remains unchanged.
Thank you, Chair.