IAEA6月理事会（議題11 その他）ステートメント（海部篤大使）（英語）
令和8年6月11日
Thank you, Chair.
Allow me to take up some topics under this agenda item AOB.
First, as Co-Chair of the Group of Friends for Women in Nuclear, Japan fully aligns itself with the joint statement delivered earlier by the Dominican Republic. We remain firmly committed to continuing our efforts to enhance women's participation in the nuclear field.
Second, on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.Japan welcomes the updates given by Australia and AUKUS partners’ transparency efforts. We appreciate their firm commitment to the highest non-proliferation standards as it is crucially important to maintain and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We steadily support the Secretariat’s dedicated efforts to this end.
Thirdly, on Fukushima water discharge, I wish to briefly touch upon some assertions raised by one preceding speaker that are inaccurate. I am privileged to offer, yet again, the following objective explanation for the sake of accurate understanding based on the facts, not based on man-made or manufactured narratives.
As stated under preceding agenda item (2), the term "contaminated water" is wholly inaccurate — Japan discharges ALPS treated water after sufficient dilution. The reviews of IAEA international Task Force and the corroborating monitoring with participation of experts from neighboring countries of Japan have been consistently reaffirmed that the discharge meets international safety standards with negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.
I wish to add that the particular Member State raising this matter participates by itself repeatedly in the activities of the review and monitoring mechanism under the IAEA framework that I just mentioned. Furthermore, the government of this particular Member State has announced that “no abnormality was seen” in terms of the results of the analytical work completed to date by its own experts and laboratories.
Japan has consistently put a top priority on the safety in using nuclear power. The IAEA’s IRRS mission this year confirmed that Japan has further strengthened its regulatory framework, observing a highly independent regulator with clear leadership and a strong focus on nuclear safety.
Fourthly, on Japan's security policy: our defense capability is necessary to ensure the security of Japan in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under its Constitution, Japan has been adhering to the exclusively defense-oriented policy, and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to or tries to coerce other countries, including neighboring ones.
On nuclear materials: all nuclear material in Japan, including plutonium, is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and is under exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguards, including the AP. This is evidenced by ongoing robust verification mechanisms, including the presence of the Agency’s only on-site laboratory in the world at Rokkasho, the number of areas subject to inspection, and the frequency of those inspections, including complementary accesses.
As a result of all those verification activities, the IAEA, including in its recent SIR 2025 discussed in this Board, has drawn the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Japan remains in peaceful activities. Therefore, there is no issue related to nuclear proliferation regarding Japan.
I am wondering where this call for “further strengthening of/scrutinizing these activities in Japan” stems from. With its technical professionalism and competency, the Secretariat has drawn broader conclusion for Japan for years. Transparency and accountability at the highest level, which is far beyond the level required by international standard, which is the INFCIRC 549, has been continuously fulfilled.
Again, just for the sake of clarity, Japan’s plutonium stocks are used for peaceful purposes such as mixed oxide fuel for research or power generation. Japan continues to uphold the principle of “not possessing plutonium without specific purposes” and takes appropriate measures to implement its policy of reducing its plutonium stockpiles.
As I said, Japan voluntarily publishes information on its plutonium management that is more detailed than is required in the international guidelines for civil plutonium management, as contained in INFCIRC/549.
These guidelines were adopted in 1997 by nine States Parties, including the five Nuclear-Weapon States. The participants have been publishing their annual reports on unirradiated civilian plutonium stocks on the IAEA website.
In this regard, I would like to remind all of you, again, of the fact that one specific Nuclear-Weapon State ceased submitting reports under these guidelines in 2017. Among the nine participants in this mechanism, it is the only one State having ceased 549-reporting, as is clear from the IAEA website. This is causing a serious lack of transparency in its plutonium management.
And next: nuclear-powered submarine. I respond briefly to the allegation regarding the discussion of nuclear-powered submarines in Japan. No specific consideration has been given to date. Period.
And finally, as repeatedly stated in my statements at the previous session of the BoG meetings, Japan observes its three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Japan has been and continues to be in full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. This stance is repeatedly explained in the NPT Review Conference in New York as well.
Japan has been consistently pursuing a path as a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, contributing to global peace and prosperity.
This stance remains unchanged.
Thank you, Chair.
Allow me to take up some topics under this agenda item AOB.
First, as Co-Chair of the Group of Friends for Women in Nuclear, Japan fully aligns itself with the joint statement delivered earlier by the Dominican Republic. We remain firmly committed to continuing our efforts to enhance women's participation in the nuclear field.
Second, on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.Japan welcomes the updates given by Australia and AUKUS partners’ transparency efforts. We appreciate their firm commitment to the highest non-proliferation standards as it is crucially important to maintain and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We steadily support the Secretariat’s dedicated efforts to this end.
Thirdly, on Fukushima water discharge, I wish to briefly touch upon some assertions raised by one preceding speaker that are inaccurate. I am privileged to offer, yet again, the following objective explanation for the sake of accurate understanding based on the facts, not based on man-made or manufactured narratives.
As stated under preceding agenda item (2), the term "contaminated water" is wholly inaccurate — Japan discharges ALPS treated water after sufficient dilution. The reviews of IAEA international Task Force and the corroborating monitoring with participation of experts from neighboring countries of Japan have been consistently reaffirmed that the discharge meets international safety standards with negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.
I wish to add that the particular Member State raising this matter participates by itself repeatedly in the activities of the review and monitoring mechanism under the IAEA framework that I just mentioned. Furthermore, the government of this particular Member State has announced that “no abnormality was seen” in terms of the results of the analytical work completed to date by its own experts and laboratories.
Japan has consistently put a top priority on the safety in using nuclear power. The IAEA’s IRRS mission this year confirmed that Japan has further strengthened its regulatory framework, observing a highly independent regulator with clear leadership and a strong focus on nuclear safety.
Fourthly, on Japan's security policy: our defense capability is necessary to ensure the security of Japan in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under its Constitution, Japan has been adhering to the exclusively defense-oriented policy, and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to or tries to coerce other countries, including neighboring ones.
On nuclear materials: all nuclear material in Japan, including plutonium, is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and is under exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguards, including the AP. This is evidenced by ongoing robust verification mechanisms, including the presence of the Agency’s only on-site laboratory in the world at Rokkasho, the number of areas subject to inspection, and the frequency of those inspections, including complementary accesses.
As a result of all those verification activities, the IAEA, including in its recent SIR 2025 discussed in this Board, has drawn the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Japan remains in peaceful activities. Therefore, there is no issue related to nuclear proliferation regarding Japan.
I am wondering where this call for “further strengthening of/scrutinizing these activities in Japan” stems from. With its technical professionalism and competency, the Secretariat has drawn broader conclusion for Japan for years. Transparency and accountability at the highest level, which is far beyond the level required by international standard, which is the INFCIRC 549, has been continuously fulfilled.
Again, just for the sake of clarity, Japan’s plutonium stocks are used for peaceful purposes such as mixed oxide fuel for research or power generation. Japan continues to uphold the principle of “not possessing plutonium without specific purposes” and takes appropriate measures to implement its policy of reducing its plutonium stockpiles.
As I said, Japan voluntarily publishes information on its plutonium management that is more detailed than is required in the international guidelines for civil plutonium management, as contained in INFCIRC/549.
These guidelines were adopted in 1997 by nine States Parties, including the five Nuclear-Weapon States. The participants have been publishing their annual reports on unirradiated civilian plutonium stocks on the IAEA website.
In this regard, I would like to remind all of you, again, of the fact that one specific Nuclear-Weapon State ceased submitting reports under these guidelines in 2017. Among the nine participants in this mechanism, it is the only one State having ceased 549-reporting, as is clear from the IAEA website. This is causing a serious lack of transparency in its plutonium management.
And next: nuclear-powered submarine. I respond briefly to the allegation regarding the discussion of nuclear-powered submarines in Japan. No specific consideration has been given to date. Period.
And finally, as repeatedly stated in my statements at the previous session of the BoG meetings, Japan observes its three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Japan has been and continues to be in full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. This stance is repeatedly explained in the NPT Review Conference in New York as well.
Japan has been consistently pursuing a path as a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, contributing to global peace and prosperity.
This stance remains unchanged.
Thank you, Chair.